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Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted in the most prominent way the importance of prudent monitoring and assessment of systemic risk. Systemic risk can be seen as the adverse consequence, for the financial system and the broader economy, of a financial institution being in financial distress. The failure of large credit institutions can not only threaten the stability of the financial system but also have dramatic effects on the real economy. It is well-documented that conditional correlations between asset returns are much stronger in periods of financial distress (see e.g. Longin and Solnik (2001) ; Ang and Chen (2002) ; Jondeau and Rockinger (2006) ; Chollete et al. (2009) , among others) and typically arise from exposure to common shocks, although amplifications of financial shocks are also associated with balance sheet channels and liquidity spirals (see e.g. Brunnermeier (2009) ; Adrian and Shin (2010) ). As a result, losses tend to spread across financial institutions during stress times, amplifying the risk of systemic contagion.
Assessing the level of contribution of the so-called systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) to systemic risk and designing a regulatory framework capable of ensuring financial stability is the foremost objective of international financial regulatory institutions. The Value-at-Risk (VaR), the risk measure most widely used by financial institutions, is not capable of capturing the systemic nature of risk since it focuses on the risk of an individual institution when viewed in isolation. As a result, there has been a growing interest in developing alternative risk measures that reflect systemic risk and avoid the shortcomings of VaR. For instance, Acharya et al. (2017) measure the propensity of a financial institution to be undercapitalised when the financial system as a whole is undercapitalised, using the systemic expected shortfall (SES). Greenwood et al. (2015) compute bank exposures to system-wide deleveraging and evaluate a variety of interventions to reduce the vulnerability of financial institutions to fire sales. Brownlees and Engle (2012) introduce the SRISK index, the expected capital shortage of a firm conditional on a substantial market decline, as an alternative measure of systemic risk while, Engle et al. (2014) develop an econometric approach to measure the systemic risk of European financial institutions. Billio et al. (2012) propose several econometric measures to capture the connectedness among financial institutions based on principal components analysis and Granger-causality networks. An extensive survey of the main quantitative measures of systemic risk in the literature can be found in Bisias et al. (2012) .
An alternative measure of systemic risk is the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , which attempts to capture risk spillovers among financial institutions and has attracted a lot of attention by the regulatory and academic communities, especially since the 2007 financial crisis. The general framework of CoVaR depends on the conditional distribution of a random variable R s,t representing the returns of the entire financial system at time t given that another financial institution i, represented by a random variable R i,t , is in distress. Currently, there are two alternative definitions of CoVaR in the literature. In the original definition by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , CoVaR is defined as the conditional distribution of R s,t given that R i,t = V aR i t , while in the modified definition of CoVaR, proposed by Girardi and Ergün (2013) , the conditioning event is R i,t ≤ V aR i t . In other words, the former definition represents the VaR of the system assuming that institution i is exactly at its VaR level whereas the latter definition of CoVaR represents the same risk metric assuming that institution i is at most at its VaR level. The latter definition of CoVaR is arguably very useful. First of all, it considers more severe distress events for institution i that are further in the tail of the loss distribution (below V aR i t level) in contrast to the highly selective and over-optimistic scenario R i,t = V aR i t . Moreover, CoVaR estimates based on R i,t ≤ V aR i t can be tested for statistical accuracy and independence using modified versions of the standard Kupiec (1995) and Christoffersen (1998) tests, respectively. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Mainik and Schaanning (2014) show that conditioning on R i,t ≤ V aR i t has great advantages for dependence modelling.
Our study builds on the CoVaR methodology described above and uses copula functions to estimate CoVaR under both definitions. We derive simple closed-form expressions for a broad range of copula families that allow the modelling of various forms of dependence, while focusing on extreme co-movements of financial system-institution returns, which is, in practice, the main concern of all systemic risk measures. Given the distinctive characteristics of copula families, our modelling approach enables the separation of dependence from marginal distributions providing greater flexibility and eliminating misspecification biases. A dynamic version of the model is also proposed -one that is capable of incorporating time-varying correlation into CoVaR calculations. Through counterexamples, we show that CoVaR measures generated by our modelling approach share the dependence consistency properties found in Mainik and Schaanning (2014) . In addition, we extend the Copula CoVaR methodology to other "co-risk" measures and derive expressions for Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES) under both definitions. Furthermore, we show that our approach can be easily employed by financial regulators as a useful stress testing tool for assessing the impact of extreme market conditions on the stability of the financial system. 2
Focusing on a portfolio of large European banks, we measure the contribution of each individual bank to systemic risk using both CoVaR and CoES systemic risk metrics. We show that the ordering of systemically important institutions and the magnitude of the 2 We note that, independently from this study, Hakwa et al. (2015) and Bernardi et al. (2017) also provide expressions for estimating CoVaR using copulas. However, our methodology provides a number of distinct advantages as it permits the use of time-varying correlations, it allows for the calculation of alternative measures of systemic risk, such as Co-Expected Shortfall (CoES) , and also allows for the computation of CoVaR as defined both in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and in Girardi and Ergün (2013) .
corresponding systemic risk measures are affected by the choice of underlying distributions, but are robust across different systemic risk measures. In a cross-country comparison, we find that banks from Spain and France have, on average, the highest contribution to systemic risk. Moreover, we investigate whether common market factors or institution specific characteristics are important determinants of systemic risk. We show that liquidity risk is an important determinant of systemic risk contribution. The large impact of funding liquidity in the pre-crisis period partly explains the "liquidity spirals" that occurred after the break out of the financial crisis in summer of 2007. Its relative impact has been reduced in the post-crisis period due to the coordinated intervention of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve in the interbank market. We also find that size and leverage are the most robust determinants of systemic risk contribution concluding that larger and more leveraged financial institutions can be harmful for the overall stability of the financial system. Finally, we investigate the link between systemic risk and macroeconomy and the extent in which changes in key macroeconomic variables contribute to systemic risk. Intuitively, we find that changes in unemployment, industrial production, stock market index and GDP contribute significantly to systemic risk.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 formally defines the CoVaR and CoES measures and presents the Copula CoVaR methodology. Derivation of closedform expressions both for CoVaR and CoES systemic risk measures are also presented in this section. Section 3 describes the data we use in the empirical part of this study and Section 4 presents the computation of systemic risk measures. Section 5 reports the results of individual contribution to systemic risk. This section also analyses the determinants of systemic risk and discusses their implications for the stability of the financial system. Section 6 concludes.
CoVaR Methodology

Definition of CoVaR
Consider a random variable R i,t that represents the returns of financial institution i at time t (i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T ). The Value-at-Risk (VaR) of the random variable R i,t at the confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), V aR i α,t , is defined as the α-quantile of the return distribution
where F −1 i,t is the generalised inverse distribution function of the return distribution F i,t , i.e., F −1 i,t (α) := inf {r i,t ∈ R : F i,t (r i,t ) ≥ α}. 3 Equivalently, Equation (1) can also be writ-3 It is common to present downside risk statistics, such as VaR, in positive values. In this paper, we do not follow this sign convention and instead maintain the original (negative) sign of the conditional quantile for all downside risk measures reported in the subsequent sections, such as VaR, CoVaR, ∆CoVaR, CoES and ∆CoES. ten as
Two different definitions of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) appear in the literature using different conditioning events. The notation CoV aR = α,β,t denotes the original definition, introduced by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , representing the β-quantile of the returns of financial system R s,t conditional on R i,t = V aR i α,t , while the notation CoV aR α,β,t denotes the alternative definition, proposed by Girardi and Ergün (2013) , where the conditioning event is R i,t ≤ V aR i α,t . Formally, CoV aR = α,β,t and CoV aR α,β,t are defined as the β-quantiles of the following conditional distributions
where s = i. The confidence levels α and β are decided ex-ante by the financial regulator.
Typical values are 1% or 5%. In most studies a common confidence level for α and β is used, i.e., α = β, however, working with different confidence levels, i.e., α = β, is also possible. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) employ linear quantile regressions to obtain CoV aR
estimates. The CoV aR = α,β,t estimates derived from this procedure, however, do not have a time-varying exposure to institution's V aR i α,t . On the other hand, Girardi and Ergün (2013) follow a three-step procedure based on univariate GARCH-type models and the bivariate DCC model of Engle (2002) to estimate CoV aR α,β,t . As a result, time-varying correlation is incorporated into their CoV aR α,β,t estimates. Their approach, however, requires numerical integration which can be computationally intensive and time expensive.
In addition, the specification of the marginal distribution depends on the choice of the bivariate distribution of R s,t and R i,t . In practice, the distributional characteristics of R s,t and R i,t can differ substantially and hence, restricting the marginal specification may introduce misspecification bias in the computation of CoV aR α,β,t .
Copula CoVaR Methodology
In this section we show how the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) can be estimated using copula functions. We provide simple analytical expressions for a broad range of copula families for both CoVaR definitions. In this respect, our Copula CoVaR approach overcomes the burden of numerical integration and also incorporates the time-varying dependence between R s,t and R i,t into the computation of systemic risk measures through the copula parameter(s). Furthermore, Copula CoVaR approach provides greater flexibility in the specification of the marginals and the dependence structure (i.e. the marginal specification is not restricted by the choice of the bivariate copula distribution), eliminating in this way potential misspecification bias in the computation of risk measures. This modelling setting also enables the decomposition of systemic risk into three main components: (a) the dependence structure; (b) the magnitude of dependence and (c) the marginal series. As a result, we can assess the relevant contribution of any of these three components to systemic risk.
The joint distribution function of bivariate random variables (Y, X) is
The famous theorem of Sklar (1959) gives the connection of marginals and copulas with the joint distribution. Let F Y X represent a bivariate cumulative distribution function with marginal distributions F Y and F X , then there exists a two dimensional copula cumulative distribution function C on [0, 1] 2 , such that for all (y, x) ∈ R 2 it holds that
For continuous F Y and F X , C is uniquely determined by
where random variables u = F Y (y) and v = F X (x) (i.e., obtained by the probability in- It can be shown (Bouyè and Salmon, 2009) , that the conditional probability distribution P r(Y ≤ y|X = x) can be expressed in terms of a copula function as
In contrast, the conditional probability distribution P r(Y ≤ y|X ≤ x) can be expressed in terms of a copula function as
The class of Archimedean copulas has recently found wide usage in the economics and finance literature due to their simple closed-form cumulative distribution functions and their properties allowing the modelling of the dependence between random variables. 4
4 For the various applications of copulas in finance see for example, Kole et al. 2007; Heinen and Valdesogo 2008; Chollete et al. 2009; Min and Czado 2010; Brechmann et al. 2012; Czado et al. 2012; Nikoloulopoulos et al. 2012; Brechmann and Czado 2013; Weiß and Scheffer 2015; Scheffer and Weiß 2017, among others . A review of the literature on copula-based models for economic and financial time series can be found in Patton (2012) .
Bivariate Archimedean copulas are defined as
where ϕ : [0, 1] → [0, ∞) is a continuous strictly decreasing convex function such that ϕ(1) = 0 and ϕ −1 is the inverse of ϕ. The function ϕ is called generator function of the copula C (see Nelsen (2007) , for further details).
We begin with the presentation of CoV aR = α,β,t in terms of Archimedean copulas and provide general solutions through their corresponding generator functions. 5 From the general result in Equation (5) we have
Assuming that the above random variables Y and X represent the financial system, R s,t , and the returns of institution i, R i,t , with distribution functions F s,t and F i,t , respectively;
can be equivalently expressed in terms of a copula generator function as follows
Solving for u, under the general condition that ∂/∂v C(u, v) is partially invertible in its first argument u, we obtain the copula conditional quantile
Applying the probability integral transform in Equation (8), we derive an explicit expression for CoV aR = α,β,t for a broad range of Archimedean copula functions, that is
CoV aR
where
i,t (α) = α. Therefore, the expression for 5 We also derive explicit expressions for CoV aR = α,β,t for the elliptical copula families, i.e., Gaussian and Student-t copulas. Due to space limitation we do not report the general expressions for those particular copula families but are available upon request. Unfortunately, there are no explicit solution for CoV aR α,β,t for these particular copula families and hence numerical integration is required. = α,β,t in Equation (9) can be simplified further as follows
Alternatively, an analytical expression can also be given for CoV aR α,β,t for a wide range of Archimedean copula families. Given the general result in Equation (6), the conditional distribution P r(R s,t ≤ CoV aR α,β,t |R i,t ≤ V aR i α,t ) can be equivalently written as
Similarly, from the definition of
i,t (α) = α. Therefore, the expression in Equation (11) can be expressed as
Finally, after solving for u and applying the probability integral transform, under the general condition that C(u, v) is partially invertible in its first argument u, CoV aR α,β,t has a general representation for Archimedean copulas, that is
The general representation of CoVaR in Equation (10) and in Equation (14) implies a constant correlation between R s,t and R i,t . However, it is known that the dependence structure between financial asset returns is not constant but rather, time-varying (see e.g. Engle (2002); Patton (2006) ; Manner and Reznikova (2012) , and references therein). Numerous studies have also indicated that the correlation between financial series tends to be more pronounced during downturns than during upturns, a stylised feature that should be considered in the estimation of systemic risk. In this respect, the use of constant correlations may affect the risk estimates and lead to incorrect inferences. We follow the specification proposed by Patton (2006) in order to introduce a dynamic version of the Copula CoVaR model and hence incorporate time-varying correlation into CoVaR estimation.
Patton (2006) proposed observation-driven copula models, for which the time-varying dependence parameter(s) of a copula is a parametric function of transformed lagged data.
In Appendix A we derive analytical expressions for CoV aR = α,β,t and CoV aR α,β,t , while in Appendix B we present the time-varying parameter specification for the Clayton, Frank, Gumbel and BB7 copulas, respectively. 6 These copula families are very popular in the literature for modelling the dependence between financial asset returns since they allow for very flexible dependency structures and can capture various forms of tail dependence.
Extension to CoES
The CoVaR concept can be easily adopted for other "co-risk" measures. One of them is the Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES). We denote by CoES = α,β,t the expected shortfall of the financial system conditional on R i,t = V aR i α,t and similarly by CoES α,β,t the expected shortfall of the financial system conditional on R i,t ≤ V aR i α,t . In this respect, CoES estimates can be easily obtained for both definitions within our framework as follows
Systemic Risk Contributor and Dependence Consistency
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , we adopt ∆CoVaR as a measure of institution i's contribution to systemic risk and also define by ∆CoV aR α,β,t the difference between the CoVaR of the financial system conditional on R i,t ≤ V aR i α,t and the CoVaR of the financial system conditional on R i,t ≤ V aR i 0.5,t (institution i being at most at its median state), that is ∆CoV aR α,β,t = CoV aR α,β,t − CoV aR 0.5,β,t .
The computation of CoV aR = 0.5,β,t or CoV aR 0.5,β,t is straightforward and can be carried out as in the CoV aR = α,β,t or CoV aR α,β,t case by simply modifying the stress scenario. We also employ ∆CoES as a measure of institution i's contribution to systemic risk where the contribution is measured in terms of CoES. Therefore, we define
where ∆CoES = α,β,t denotes the difference between the CoES of the financial system conditional on R i,t = V aR i α,t and the CoES of the financial system conditional on R i,t = V aR i 0.5,t , while ∆CoES α,β,t denotes the same risk metric with stress scenarios being
To investigate whether the different representations for measuring contribution to systemic risk, derived within the Copula CoVaR framework, encompass the dependence consistency properties reported in Mainik and Schaanning (2014) , we compare ∆CoV aR estimates for the bivariate distribution with a Clayton copula. 7 Figure 1 presents ∆CoV aR = α,β,t and ∆CoV aR α,β,t measures as a function of the dependence parameter θ for a Clayton copula with Student-t marginals with three degrees of freedom at three different confidence levels, i.e., 1%, 5% and 10%. The behaviour of risk measures in these two models confirms the results in Mainik and Schaanning (2014) . Initially, ∆CoV aR = α,β,t increases with respect to the dependence parameter; however, after a certain threshold it counter-intuitively starts to decrease. In other words, ∆CoV aR = α,β,t fails to detect dependence when it becomes more pronounced. On the other hand, ∆CoV aR α,β,t increases with respect to the dependence parameter. Therefore, conditioning on R i,t ≤ V aR i α,t gives a much more consistent response to dependence than conditioning on R i,t = V aR i α,t .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Data
We Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Lòpez-Espinosa et al. (2012) , we work with weekly returns to avoid the non-synchronicity of daily data. Therefore, we obtain weekly equity adjusted prices -to account for capital operations (i.e., splits, dividends etc.) -from the Datastream database and generate weekly log returns. There are 562 weekly returns for each institution in our sample, a list of which can be found in Appendix C. For each bank, an equally-weighted average of the returns of the remaining banks in the sample is used as a proxy for the financial system. This way, the resulting system return portfolios can be considered representative of the European financial system, allowing the study of possible spillover effects between a stressed institution and the financial system. Moreover, this approach rules out any spurious correlation that may be induced by banks that are more heavily represented in the composition of the financial system proxy. For example, HSBC has a total contribution of 20.5% to the composition of the STOXX Europe 600
Banks Index. As a result, if the corresponding index is used as a proxy for the financial system, systemic risk estimates generated conditional on HSBC will be severely affected by the presence and large scale factor of HSBC in the financial system's portfolio proxy.
Copula CoVaR Estimation
The computation of CoVaR or CoES requires the estimation of the parameter(s) of the marginal densities and the copula function that captures the dependence between R s,t and R i,t . Assume a vector of system and institution returns R t = (R s,t , R i,t ) , (t = 1, . . . , T ; i = 1, . . . , N ) where s = i. Given that a copula function and the marginals are continuous, their joint probability density function can be expressed in terms of the copula density function, c(·, · ; θ t ), and the univariate marginal densities, f s,t (R s,t ; φ s ) and
where θ t denotes the copula parameter while φ s and φ i denote the parameters for the system's and institution i's marginal distributions, respectively. In the above expression
The log-likelihood function of Equation (17) is given by (18) with respect to the parameters (θ t , φ s , φ i ). In general, the full MLE estimation would be our first choice due to the well-known optimality properties of maximum likelihood. However, the Inference Functions for Margins (IFM) method is usually preferred to full MLE due to its computational tractability and comparable efficiency. The IFM method (see Joe (1997) , for further details) is a multi-step optimisation technique. It divides the parameter vector into separate parameters for each marginal distribution and parameters for the copula model. Therefore, one may break up the optimisation problem into two parts. In this study we adopt the IFM method to estimate the parameters of the marginal distributions and copula function and subsequently obtain CoVaR and CoES estimates.
It is well-documented, since the pioneering works of Mandelbrot (1967) and Fama (1965) , that asset return distributions are skewed and fat-tailed. Moreover, the volatility of asset returns is not constant; it is mean-reverting and tends to cluster. Another important stylised characteristic of asset returns volatility is that a large negative price shock increases volatility much more than a positive price shock of the same magnitude, which is also known as "leverage-effect". To address these features we assume that the returns of the financial system and of institution i at time t, R t = (R s,t , R i,t ) , follow an AR(1)-GJR-GARCH(1,1) model of Glosten et al. (1993) . Therefore for j ≡ s, i and time t = 1, . . . , T we estimate
where I t−1 is an indicator function equal to 1 if ε j,t−1 < 0, and 0 otherwise. We assume that the distribution of the innovations z j,t is a white noise process with zero mean, unit variance and a distribution function given by F z j ,t . To allow for asymmetry in the marginal distributions, we assume that the distribution of the innovations follows the skewed-t distribution, as introduced in Fernández and Steel (1998) . For comparison, we also estimate the time-series models in Equation (19) and in Equation (20) based on the assumption of normal distributed innovations. We denote the cumulative distribution functions of the financial system and institution i's innovations by u t ≡ F zs,t (z s,t ) and v t ≡ F z i ,t (z i,t ), respectively. The dependence parameter is then estimated by maximising the log-likelihood function in Equation (18), conditional on the estimated parameters of the marginal series.
In this respect, CoVaR estimates can be obtained by evaluating the analytical expressions derived in section 2.2. Note that the conditional quantiles implied by Equation (8) and in Equation (13) 
where F −1 zs,t is the generalised inverse of the financial system's innovation distribution function and u = t and u ≤ t are the conditional quantiles of the general solutions in Equation (8) and in Equation (13), respectively. 9 Also note that the conditional quantiles in Equation (8) and in Equation (13) correspond to a static model (i.e., θ is constant). However, the dynamic version of the model (i.e., θ t is time-varying) implies that conditional quantiles also have time-varying exposure to dependence. Therefore, we use the subscript t in u = t and u ≤ t to distinguish between the dynamic and static model.
Results
Computing CoVaR and CoES measures
In this section we present results based on the representation of CoVaR by Girardi and Ergün (2013) . As discussed earlier, under this definition CoVaR is dependent consistent measure of systemic risk, and can be statistically evaluated, providing a distinctive opportunity to assess the statistical adequacy of systemic risk models. In our search for the copula model that can sufficiently describe the dependence between financial system and institution returns, we consider four alternative copula functional forms: Clayton, Frank, Gumbel and BB7. We are interested in positive dependence between the variables, as is modeled by each of the listed copulas, but also in different types of tail dependence. For example, the Clayton copula only allows for negative tail dependence and would hence fit best if negative changes in financial system and institution returns are more highly correlated than positive changes. In contrast, the Gumbel copula only allows for positive tail dependence, while the Frank copula does not allow for tail dependence. Finally, the BB7 copula allows for asymmetric upper and lower tail dependence. In practice, CoVaR focuses on the joint tail distribution of the financial system-institution pair returns and thus tail dependence is a rather important concept for CoVaR computation.
We estimate dynamic CoV aR α,β,t and CoES α,β,t measures for each institution i. We employ two alternative distributional assumptions for the marginal series: Gaussian and
9 To obtain time-varying CoES measures, the same process as in the computation of CoVaR is followed, however, the copula conditional quantiles u = t and u ≤ t are obtained from the corresponding expressions in Equation (15) and in Equation (16), respectively. Skewed-t. The selection of the best-fitting copula model for each system-institution pair is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) . 10 All risk mea- CoES α,β,t ) are computed at the same confidence level, i.e., α = β = 5%. We also evaluate CoV aR α,β,t estimates for statistical accuracy and independence using modified versions of the standard Kupiec (1995) and Christoffersen (1998) tests (see Girardi and Ergün (2013) , for further details on the implementation of the modified tests). that high values of Kendall's τ correlations are associated with higher, in absolute value, systemic risk estimates. Therefore, a systemic risk measure that provides an inconsistent response to dependence may fail to detect systemic risk when it is more pronounced, i.e., during periods of financial distress, and thus lead financial system regulators to make inappropriate policy decisions.. Figure 4 displays a cross-section plot of an institution's average V aR i α,t and its contribution to systemic risk, measured by average ∆CoV aR α,β,t . We note that there is a weak relationship between the institution's V aR i α,t and its ∆CoV aR α,β,t in the cross-section. Similar findings are also reported in Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Girardi and Ergün (2013) leading to the conclusion that regulating the risk of financial institutions in isolation, through institutions' VaR, might not be the optimal policy for protecting the financial sector against systemic risk. Figure 5 plots Table 1 ranks the contribution of each individual bank to overall systemic risk, as measured by the time-series average of ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t estimates, under the assumption of Gaussian and skewed-t marginals, respectively. Table 1 also displays the selected copula functions and the average value of Kendall's τ correlation coefficients implied by the estimated copula parameters of each financial system-institution pair. The Frank copula is the most preferred functional form for describing the dependence between financial system and institution returns and the Gumbel copula is the second most popular choice under the assumption of Gaussian marginals. In contrast, the BB7 copula is the most popular functional form for modelling the dependence under the skewed-t marginals assumption, while the Frank copula is the second most favoured choice. The Clayton copula has not been selected for any of the pairs analysed under both marginal assumptions.
Systemic risk contribution
It is clear from Table 1 that the distribution assumptions in the marginals affect the selection of the best-fitting copula and hence the overall CoV aR α,β,t and CoES α,β,t results. Therefore, particular attention should be paid when specifying marginals since the use of inappropriate marginals not only introduces biases directly but also affects systemic risk measures indirectly, through copula parameter estimation or copula misspecification.
[Insert Table 1 here]
The average ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t estimates with skewed-t marginals are much 11 This conclusion results from estimating CoVaR under both stress scenarios Ri,t = V aR i α,t and Ri,t ≤ V aR i α,t and employing different ∆CoVaR definitions for three copula models: Clayton, Gumbel and Frank. Numerical integration is used to estimate CoVaR when explicit expressions are not available in our Copula CoVaR framework. The weak relationship between ∆CoVaR and VaR in the time series is supported only when the definition of ∆CoVaR used is that of Girardi and Ergün (2013) , regardless of different CoVaR definitions.
higher in absolute value than those generated under the assumption of Gaussian marginals.
The size differences in systemic risk measures, however, result not only from the alternative marginal assumptions but also from the characteristics of the copula functions that model the dependence for each pair. The dominant copula function when assuming Gaussian marginals is Frank, while BB7 is the most popular copula family under skewed-t marginals. As explained, the Frank copula does not imply tail dependence, while the BB7 copula allows for asymmetric tail dependence. In this regard, the general dependence structure, and especially the dependence structure in extremes, affects substantially the computation of CoV aR α,β,t and CoES α,β,t . This is also confirmed by the implied Kendall's τ estimates reported in Table 1 . It is clear from Table 1 that for those copula families that do not imply lower tail dependence, such as the Frank or the Gumbel copula family, the average ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t estimates are primarily driven by the degree of dependence.
The stronger the dependence between financial system-institution returns the higher the average values of ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t . In contrast, when the dependence between the financial system and an institution's returns is modelled by an asymmetric BB7 copula, the average ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t estimates are not monotonic functions of Kendall's τ correlation estimates but their values are also affected by the degree of tail dependence. Figure 6 shows the average time-varying upper (λ U ) and lower (λ L ) tail dependence indices estimated from those pairs modelled by a BB7 copula under the assumption of skewed-t marginals. There is clear evidence of asymmetric tail dependence.
[Insert Figure 6 here] The average value of upper and lower tail dependence indices is 0.45 and 0.50, respectively, leading to the conclusion that joint negative extremes occur more often than joint positive extremes. To investigate further the impact of asymmetries on the tails in the computation of systemic risk metrics, we compute non-parametric (N-P) estimates (an average of non-parametric estimates in Dobrić and Schmid (2005) ) for upper (λ U ) and lower (λ L ) tail dependence coefficients and sample Kendall's τ correlation coefficients for each financial system-institution pair of standardised residuals, obtained from the fit of the univariate time-series models in section 5. Table 2 reports average ∆CoV aR α,β,t , nonparametric Kendall's τ correlation estimates and non-parametric tail dependence indices for each pair. It is not surprising that banks having high coefficients of lower tail dependence appear among the most systemic financial institutions, indicating in this way the importance of asymmetries in systemic risk modelling.
[Insert Table 2 here] The ranking of the systemically important financial institutions in Table 1 varies signifi- cantly across different marginal distributional assumptions but is more consistent across different systemic risk measures within the same marginal distributional assumptions. For example, Santander bank is ranked as the 2 nd most systemic financial institution according to its average contribution to systemic risk, measured by ∆CoV aR α,β,t , under the assumption of Gaussian marginals, while it is ranked in the 7 th place when skewed-t marginals are assumed instead. Moreover, BNP Paribas is ranked as the 3 rd most systemic bank based on its average ∆CoES α,β,t measure under normality, but under the assumption of skewed-t marginals it is ranked in the 26 th place. Nevertheless, the hierarchy of systemic banks across ∆CoV aR α,β,t and ∆CoES α,β,t does not differ significantly under the same marginal distribution assumptions, implying that qualitative results depend more on the underlying distribution assumptions in the marginals and dependence structure and less on the systemic risk measures per se. 12 From the ranking results in Table 1 and the market capitalisation values of financial institutions reported in Table 9 in Appendix C, it can also be shown that banks which are large in size with strong cross-country exposure and international activity appear among the most systemic financial institutions under both distribution assumptions. One may regard this classification as an economic paradox, since banks that belong to those national economies that have suffered the most from the European sovereign debt crisis -and the market value of whose corresponding share prices has declined significantly during the crisis -appear among the least systemic financial institutions in the cross-country comparison. However, banks from these particular countries are typical commercial banks with substantial presence in the local market but limited international activity and cross-country exposure. Therefore, the implied correlation and, more impor-tantly, the dependence in extreme events between these banks and the financial system is typically reduced generating in this way lower in absolute value systemic risk estimates. This is also confirmed by the fact that the Frank copula which does not allow for tail dependence is the preferred copula functional form for most of these particular pairs.
[Insert Table 3 here] These findings should not be regarded as a weakness of the CoVaR model but rather as a merit. According to , a systemic risk measure should be able to identify the risk to the system by individually "systemically important" institutions, which are highly interconnected and large enough to cause negative spill over effects on others, as well as by small institutions that are "systemic" when acting as parts of a herd.
In this respect, the relative size and the interconnectedness of each particular financial institution are factors that should be considered in systemic risk measurement. The CoVaR methodology implicitly incorporates institution size and interconnectedness into systemic risk estimation through correlation and dependence on extreme events. In our study, the financial system is represented by components of the STOXX Europe 600 Banks Index, which includes the largest banks in terms of market capitalisation in Europe. It is a portfolio of 42 financial institutions from 15 different European countries. The majority of and the largest in size among these financial institutions come from countries such as Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Great Britain. Therefore, the implied dependence between each of these particular institutions and the financial system is, by construction, stronger due to within-country dependence (e.g increased commonalities for institution returns from same country) and the dependence that arises from their large size and dominant position in the European market. This may partly explain why banks from these particular countries are listed among the most systemic financial institutions in our study. The results in Table 4 support this argument. Table 4 reports average sample Kendall's τ and non-parametric upper (λ U ) and lower (λ L ) tail dependence estimates for each country. It is evident that Kendall's τ correlations and non-parametric tail dependence coefficients are much stronger for these particular countries, implying a stronger dependence and dependence in the tails of the joint distribution and consequently higher, on average, systemic risk estimates.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Backtesting and Stress testing CoVaR
A well-specified risk model should satisfy the appropriate theoretical statistical properties. Therefore, the proportion of exceedances should approximately equal the confidence level, while the exceedances should not occur in clusters but independently. Table 5 reports the average p-values from the modified Kupiec (1995) and Christoffersen (1998) statistical tests for the unconditional coverage, independence and conditional coverage of CoV aR α,β,t estimates under both Gaussian and skewed-t distribution assumptions computed at α = β = 5% level.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The null hypotheses of unconditional and conditional coverage are rejected at the 5% level of significance under the Gaussian assumption. On the other hand, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels under the assumption of skewed-t marginals. Thus, it seems that a combination of copula functions -that allow for asymmetries in the tails -with asymmetric marginals is a better candidate for systemic risk modeling. Our test results are in line with the CoVaR backtesting results in Girardi and Ergün (2013) and the results in the VaR literature that reject the underlying assumption of normality in favour of alternative distributions which allow for asymmetries. We also compare the Copula ∆CoV aR estimates to those calculated using the methodology of Girardi and Ergün (2013) using both Normal and Student-t models. The approach of Girardi and Ergün is preferred for comparison purposes as it is analytically tractable and enables direct comparisons with our Copula CoVaR methodology. We compare the performance of the models graphically, in Figure 7 , and statistically using the modified conditional coverage and independence tests, reported in Panel B of Table 5 .
[Insert Figure 7 here] As shown in Figure 7 , ∆CoV aR estimates show strong dependence, the correlation between Copula and Girardi and Ergün ∆CoV aR being 99.97% for the Normal and 99.95% for non-normal models. Consistent with the copula estimates, the Student-t ∆CoV aR estimates in Girardi and Ergün pass the conditional and unconditional coverage tests thus providing, nominally at least, similar performance to that of the copula model. However, visual comparison of the estimates indicates that the Copula model provides consistently lower (in absolute terms) values thus leading to more efficient estimates and allocation of capital. This empirical feature, along with the superior analytical tractability of the Copula CoVaR, indicate the superiority of the proposed method.
Stress testing exercises are also useful for financial regulators to gauge the potential implications of extreme market conditions for the stability of the financial system as a whole.
Before the outset of the financial crisis, financial stability stress tests were largely focused on the implications of system-wide macroeconomic shocks and rarely considered idiosyncratic shocks such as the failure of a single large firm. Recently, there has been a growing interest in such systemic stress testing exercises by central banks and financial regulators.
Our modelling framework can be easily employed as part of the tool-kit for financial stability assessment. Stress testing exercises under this framework can simulate scenarios that are absent from historical data or are more likely to occur than historical observation suggests, as well as simulate shocks that reflect permanent structural breaks or temporal dependence breakdowns. Figure 8 displays a scenario analysis example for HSBC and demonstrates its influence on systemic risk as measured by CoV aR α,β,t under certain scenarios. In particular, Figure 8 plots the implied CoV aR α,β,t measures generated by the Clayton, Gumbel, Frank and BB7 copulas for β = 0.01 to 0.80, α = 0.05 and the dependence parameter(s) estimated for each particular copula family assuming skewed-t marginals. 13 Therefore, the discrepancies in CoV aR α,β,t measures are due to the employment of different copula models and do not arise from marginal specifications. The implied CoV aR α,β,t results in Figure 8 have an appealing interpretation. For instance, we are 99% confident, given that HSBC is at most at its 95% VaR level, that the financial system will not experience a distress event worse than −16.84% according to the Clayton copula. For the same confidence level, CoV aR α,β,t estimates implied by the Gumbel, Frank and BB7 copulas are −15.08%, −13.56% and −16.74%, respectively. 14 [Insert Figure 8 here]
Given the unique ability of copula functions to enable the separation of dependence from marginal distributions, we are able to quantify the potential effects on the stability of the financial system of risks associated with marginal distribution assumptions or risks related to the dependence structure. For example, a scenario that implies a structural break in the correlation between the financial system and an institution's returns can be analysed by modifying the level of Kendall's τ parameter, while a change in the dependence structure can be studied through alternative copula functional forms. Similarly, a scenario that implies high volatility or severe equity price declines can be examined through alternative marginal specifications. Complex stress test exercises that combine all the above scenarios can also be analysed simultaneously, thus providing a powerful tool for systemic risk assessment. 13 We could also set the parameters for the Clayton, Gumbel and Frank copulas to a pre-specified value such as the Kendall's τ sample correlation coefficient because there is a one-to-one relationship between these particular one-parameter copula families and Kendall's τ . Such a relationship, however, does not exist for the two-parameter BB7 copula. To maintain the consistency of the implied systemic risk estimates, we use the estimated parameter(s) for each particular copula family instead.
14 Similar stress testing exercises can also be obtained using CoES α,β,t as a measure of systemic risk. Tables 1 and 3 . We note in Figure 8 that the Clayton and BB7 copulas, which allow for lower tail dependence, produce much larger in absolute value CoV aR α,β,t measures compared to the corresponding measures generated by the Frank or Gumbel copulas, which do not allow for lower tail dependence. As already explained, the average ∆CoV aR α,β,t or ∆CoES α,β,t measures reported in Tables 1 and 3 do not differ in size only due to alternative distribution assumptions in marginals but also due to the different characteristics of the alternative copula functional forms employed. Therefore, copula misspecification may critically affect the systemic risk estimates and therefore dependence modelling should proceed with caution.
Systemic risk determinants
In this section, we investigate the main drivers of systemic risk in the European banking system. The analysis is split into three main parts. In the first part, we investigate whether there are common market factors explaining an institution's contribution to systemic risk and seek to understand how this relationship is altered in the face of changes in the market environment. We also investigate how and in which direction these factors affect systemic risk. As explained, systemic risk measures can be decomposed within the Copula CoVaR framework due to the unique ability of copula functions to enable the separation of dependence from marginal distributions. Thus, CoVaR is an increasing nonlinear function of the correlation between the financial system and institution i and of the financial system's volatility. This separation allows us to assess the impact of market factors on these variables and analyse their importance for the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the dependent variables in our formal empirical work are ∆CoV aR α,β,t , Kendall's τ correlations and the financial system's volatility σ s estimates, obtained in section 5.1. 15 For each set of the dependent variables y i,t we run the following panel regression model 
where y i,t denotes the set of ∆CoV aR i α,β,t , Kendall's τ i t and financial system's volatility σ i s,t estimates for each financial institution i and week t. The I crisis represents dummy variables that take the value of zero in the pre-crisis period and the value of one in the period we designate as the crisis period. 16 In addition, the right-hand side of Equation (21) includes the following market variables:
(i) Vix, which is a proxy for the implied volatility in the stock market reported by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).
(ii) Liquidity, which is a short term "liquidity spread" defined as the difference between the three-month interbank offered rate and the three-month repo rate. This spread is a common proxy for short-term funding liquidity risk. We use the three-month Euribor rate and the three-month Eurepo rate, both reported by the European Banking Federation (EBF).
(iii) ∆Euribor, which is the change in the three-month Euribor rate.
(iv) ∆Slope, which is the change in the slope of the yield curve, measured by the spread between the German ten-year government bond yield and the German three-month Bubill rate.
(v) ∆Credit, which is the change in the credit spread between the ten-year Moody's seasoned BAA-rated corporate bond and the German ten-year government bond.
(vi) S&P, which is the S&P 500 Composite Index returns and used as a proxy for equity market returns.
The data have been obtained from Bloomberg and are sampled weekly. Table 6 reports bank fixed-effect panel regression estimates for ∆CoV aR α,β,t , Kendall's τ and the financial's system volatility σ s estimates on the above lagged market variables. Across both sub-periods, the lagged values of the Vix, Liquidity and ∆Euribor variables appear highly significant in explaining the variation in ∆CoV aR α,β,t at conventional significance levels.
In particular, higher lagged values of implied market volatility are associated with more negative ∆CoV aR α,β,t measures in the pre-crisis period. In contrast, the impact of lagged S&P Return, ∆Spread and ∆Slope variables on ∆CoV aR α,β,t does not appear statistically significant in this period (∆Slope is significant only at 10% level). Alter and Schüer (2012) . Secondly, the period December 2009 -9 September 2012 which covers the period up to the official announcement of the outright monetary transactions (OMT) program by the European Central Bank, the importance of which in bringing an end to the Eurozone crisis is highlighted in Saka et al. (2015) . Therefore, crisis dummy variables were used only for these two sub-periods (i.e. Table 6 .
[Insert Table 6 here]
The results in Table 6 also highlight the importance of funding liquidity in systemic risk contribution. Banks typically raise short-term funding in the unsecured interbank market or through over-the-counter collateralised repurchase agreements (repos). In times of uncertainty, banks charge higher rates for unsecured loans and thus interbank offered rates increase. The spread between the Euribor and the Eurepo rate measures the difference in interest rates between short-term fundings of different risk. As Figure 9 shows, this spread had shrunk to historical low levels during the pre-crisis period but it began to surge upward during the crisis period. The positive impact of funding liquidity on ∆CoV aR α,β,t in the pre-crisis period is confirmed by the results in Table 6 . The coefficient of Liquidity in this period is negative and rather significant in magnitude. On average, a 1% increase in Liquidity, which indicates a worsening of funding liquidity, contributes almost 13.7% to systemic risk as measured by ∆CoV aR α,β,t .
[Insert Figure 9 Consequently, both events triggered fire-sales, pushing asset prices further down, and increased the uncertainty in the interbank lending market. As a result, European banks that relied excessively on short-term funding were particularly exposed to a dry-up in liquidity.
In this respect, the large size of the pre-crisis liquidity spread coefficient estimate partly explains why the sudden dry-up in liquidity had such a severe impact on the stability of the financial system.
The regression results in Table 6 for the ∆Euribor variable are also of great interest. As explained, the Euribor rate represents the unsecured rate at which a large panel of European banks borrow funds from one another. An increase in short-term rates implies a higher borrowing cost for banks. In this respect, banks relying on short-term funding are more vulnerable to liquidity risk. The pre-crisis coefficient estimate of the change in the three-month Euribor rate variable indicates the positive relation between changes in the short-term rates and systemic risk contribution. On average, an increase by 1% in the change of the three-month Euribor rate adds an additional 3.7% to ∆CoV aR α,β,t . The overall increase in systemic risk during the crisis period, however, is not only driven by the solvency problems of several Euro-area financial institutions, but also by the sovereign debt crisis of a large number of Eurozone member countries. As Figure 10 suggests, systemic risk estimates reached their highest levels after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008; however, high values are also associated with the inability of several countries in the Euro-zone to repay or refinance their government debt without the assistance of third parties. As Shambaugh (2012) points out, the euro area faced three interdependent crises, that is, a sovereign debt crisis, a banking crisis and a growth and competitiveness crisis. In this respect, the problems of undercapitalised banks and high sovereign debt are mutually reinforcing, and both are amplified by slow and unequally distributed -among euro area member countries. -growth Therefore, our regression results and the asymmetric response of market factors on systemic risk should be viewed in conjunction with the overall characteristics of the crisis in the Eurozone.
It is also of great interest to investigate the effect of market factors on Kendall's τ correlation estimates and the financial system's volatility σ s estimates. Kendall's τ correlation estimates are asymmetrically related to lagged values of the Vix and Liquidity variables, although the magnitude of the asymmetries is not large. Interestingly, liquidity shocks (the widening of liquidity spread) reduce Kendall's τ correlation in the pre-crisis period, while having a positive impact on it in the crisis period. A widening in ∆Credit also suggests a decrease in Kendall's τ correlation in both periods. The above market factors also appear significant in explaining the financial system's volatility and demonstrate the same asymmetric behaviour. In the pre-crisis period, an increase in the Vix, Liquidity or ∆Credit variables increases the financial system's volatility and as a consequence the level of systemic risk, while the impact of these factors on the financial system's volatility is the opposite in the post-crisis period. The ∆Euribor variable is also asymmetrically related to the financial system's volatility; however, the degree of asymmetry is pretty high between these sub-periods, with the regression coefficients changing from 3.453 to -5.494. This substantial asymmetric response also highlights the impact of the European Central Bank's (ECB) intervention in the interbank market.
In the post-crisis period, an increase in the change of the three-month Euribor rate counterintuitively, suggests a reduction in the financial system's volatility. However, as shown in Figures 10 and 11 , the action taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the crisis period eventually reduced the level of short-term interest rates and, thus, distorted the positive pre-crisis relationship between the change in short-term rates and the financial system's volatility. From the results in Table 5 , it can also be seen that the impact of funding liquidity is primarily transmitted on ∆CoV aR α,β,t through the financial system's volatility and not through Kendall's τ correlation. In other words, the sudden dry-up of liquidity in the pre-crisis period reduced the level of correlation among financial institutions but considerably increased the volatility of the financial system. This can also be confirmed by comparing the estimated coefficients of the Liquidity variable with the estimated coefficients of the ∆CoV aR α,β,t and the financial system's volatility variables, which are almost identical in absolute value.
In the second part of our analysis, we investigate how individual characteristics of financial institutions contribute to systemic risk. In this regard, we employ panel regressions and regress quarterly-aggregated ∆CoV aR α,β,t measures on a set of institution-specific variables. In particular, we consider the following panel regression model with fixed effects:
where ∆CoV aR i α,β,t represents the quarterly-aggregated ∆CoV aR measures for institution i computed from the first stage as described in Section 5.1. In addition, we use the following set of quarterly bank-specific characteristics: (i) V aR i α,t−k defined as the quarterly-aggregated VaR measures for bank i at quarter t−k, calculated by averaging the corresponding weekly measures within each quarter.
(ii) M tB i,t−k defined as the ratio of the market to book value of total equity for bank i at quarter t − k and used as a proxy for growth opportunities.
(iii) Size i,t−k defined as the log of book value of total equity for bank i at quarter t − k.
(iv) Leverage i,t−k defined as the ratio of the total assets to book value of total equity for bank i at quarter t − k and used as a proxy for the solvency of the bank.
(v) Beta i,t−k is the equity market beta for bank i at quarter t−k, calculated from weekly equity return data within each quarter.
(vi) V ol i,t−k is the equity return volatility for bank i at quarter t − k, calculated from weekly equity return data within each quarter.
The balance-sheet data for each individual bank are obtained from Worldscope database. Table 7 reports results from panel regressions, after controlling for bank fixed-effects and, additionally, allowing for bank and time clustered errors. We report results from three different specifications based on the forecast horizon of explanatory variables: one quarter, one year and two years. Across forecast periods, Size and Leverage appear to be the most robust determinants of systemic risk. The estimated coefficient of the Size variable is negative and highly significant, suggesting that bigger institutions contribute more to systemic risk than smaller institutions.
[Insert Table 7 here]
These findings support the empirical results in Section 5.2. Some of the largest banks in our sample are placed among the most systemic financial institutions based on their average ∆CoVaR or ∆CoES measures as reported in Table 1 . Furthermore, Leverage is negative and significant across all forecasting horizons. As explained, Leverage is used as a proxy for the solvency of the financial institution. The negative coefficient estimates of Leverage across all forecasting horizons imply that highly leveraged banks contribute more to systemic risk than low leveraged banks. In addition, the VaR of each financial institution and equity return volatility are statistically significant at the one quarter horizon, whereas equity beta is statistically significant at the two year horizon. Overall, our results in Table 7 are in line with other studies. Similar to Acharya et al. (2017), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) and Girardi and Ergün (2013) , we find that size, leverage and equity beta are important determinants of systemic risk. However, we found no statistical support for the hypothesis that the market to book value of total equity ratio is important in explaining institutions' contribution to systemic risk.
In the third part of our analysis, we attempt to shed some light into how major macroeconomic variables contribute to systemic risk. As a result, we employ panel regressions and regress quarterly-aggregated ∆CoV aR α,β,t measures on major country-specific macroeconomic variables. In particular, we consider the following panel regression model with fixed effects:
where ∆CoV aR i c,α,β,t represents the quarterly-aggregated ∆CoV aR measures for institution i at its country of domicile c computed from the first stage as described in Section 5.1.
In addition, we use the following set of quarterly macro-economic characteristics:
(i) ∆U nemployment c,t−k is the change in harmonised unemployment rate for country c at quarter t − k.
(ii) Inf lation c,t−k is the percentage change of consumer price index for country c at quarter t − k.
(iii) ∆Share c,t−k is the growth rate of stock market index for country c at quarter t − k.
(iv) ∆IndustrialP roduction c,t−k is the growth rate of industrial production for country c at quarter t − k.
(v) ∆Rates c,t−1 is the change in long-term (i.e. 10-year maturity) sovereign yields for country c at quarter t − k.
(vi) GDP Growth c,t−k is the GDP growth rate for country c at quarter t − k.
(vii) ∆CurrentAccount c,t−k is the change in current account (as % of GDP) for country c at quarter t − k.
(viii) ∆Debt/GDP c,t−k is the change in debt to GDP ratio for country c at quarter t − k.
The macroeconomic data for each country are obtained from OECD's statistics database. 17 Table 8 reports results from panel regressions, after controlling for bank fixed-effects and, additionally, allowing for bank and time clustered errors. We report results from three different specifications based on the forecast horizon of explanatory variables: one quarter, one year and two years.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Regression results show that an increase in unemployment rate, a decrease in the domestic stock market index, a decrease in industrial production and a decrease in GDP growth, contribute to an increase in the systemic risk next quarter, at the 5% level. Nevertheless, all macroeconomic variables in the analysis are statistically insignificant at 5% for the one and two year horizons. Table 8 contribute to the literature that investigates the link between systemic risk and macroeconomy. The analysis indicates that movements in certain macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, industrial production, GDP and share index contribute significantly to systemic risk as measured by our Copula ∆CoV aR estimates.
Summary
During the 2007-2008 financial crisis, losses were spread out rapidly across financial institutions, thus affecting the entire financial system. According to Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) , these spillovers were realisations of systemic risk -the risk that the distress of an individual institution, or a group of institutions, will induce financial instability on a broader scale. To capture these spillover effects, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) proposed the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR). This new measure of systemic risk, attracted quickly the attention of the academic and regulatory communities.
In this study, we propose a new methodology for estimating CoVaR, based on copula functions. The proposed methodology circumvents some of the limitations in estimation of the original CoV aR model. In particular, the proposed Copula CoVaR methodology provides simple, explicit expressions for a broad range of copula families, while allowing the CoVaR of an institution to have time-varying exposure to its VaR. Further, this methodology is extended to estimate other systemic risk measures, such as the Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES).
Given the properties of copula functions that enable the separation of dependence from marginal distributions, the model provides a distinct way for quantifying how shocks in the conditional volatilities or dependence structure of financial institutions' assets can affect systemic risk. The Copula CoVaR methodology can also facilitate stress testing and sensitivity analysis and thus inform regulators for potential threats to the stability of the financial system. Under certain conditions, the model can be also extended to incorporate additional conditioning scenarios and thus study how a group of financial institutions being in distress, can affect financial stability. Therefore, the proposed Copula CoVaR methodology also has great advantages for systemic risk measurement with significant policy implications.
We focus on a portfolio of large European banks and estimate CoVaR and CoES measures.
We illustrate the importance of taking asymmetries into account and highlight the threats to accurate systemic risk measurement posed by misspecification biases in the marginals or the dependence model. We also investigate whether there are common market factors explaining an institution's contribution to systemic risk. In principle, lagged values of the implied market volatility, of funding liquidity, of credit spread and of the change in the three month Euribor rate are significant in explaining ∆CoVaR. They also appear important in explaining the correlation between the financial system and each institution, as well as the financial system's volatility. The asymmetric behaviour of market factors across the pre-crisis and crisis periods, is partly attributed to the coordinated intervention of central banks in response to the financial crisis.
Finally, we investigate the impact of bank-specific and major macroeconomic factors on systemic risk. Across all alternative model specifications considered, size and leverage appears to be most robust bank-specific determinants of systemic risk, implying that bigger and highly leveraged financial institutions can generate large systemic risk externalities.
In addition, we find that changes in certain macroeconomic variables such as an increase in unemployment rate, a decrease in the domestic stock market index, a decrease in industrial production and a decrease in GDP growth, contribute to an increase in the systemic risk next quarter. (2011), we compute standard errors that cluster by both firm and time. * * * denotes significant at 1%, * * denotes significant at 5% and * denotes significant at 10%. 
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A.2. Frank Copula
This copula is also a member of the Archimedean copula family with dependence parameter θ ∈ (−∞, ∞)\{0} and generator function ϕ = − ln e −δu −1 e −δ −1 . Frank copula allows for both positive and negative dependence structures, however, it does not imply tail dependence.
The distribution function is given by C(u, v ; δ) = − 1 δ ln 1 1 − e −δ (1 − e −δ ) − (1 − e −δu )(1 − e −δv ) .
An analytical expression for CoV aR = α,β,t for this copula family can be derived as 
CoV aR
In contrast, an explicit expression for CoV aR α,β,t for the Frank copula is given as follows
CoV aR α,β,t = F −1 s,t − 1 δ ln 1 − (1 − e −δ ) − (1 − e −δ )(e −δβα ) (1 − e −δα ) .
A.3. Gumbel Copula
The Gumbel copula with dependence parameter θ ∈ Analytical expressions for CoV aR = α,β,t and CoV aR α,β,t can be obtain from the general solutions in equations Equation (10) and Equation (14) 
B. Dynamic Copula CoVaR
For the Clayton and Gumbel copulas the following parametric representation is proposed where the evolution of δ t is constrained to ensure that remains in its domain. For the two-parametric Archimedean BB7 copula a similar parametric representation for each tail dependence coefficient is considered. The BB7 copula is constructed by taking a particular Laplace transformation of Clayton's copula. The BB7 copula distribution is given by C (u, v ; θ, δ) 
where θ = 1/ log 2 (2 − τ U ), δ = −1/ log 2 (τ L ) and τ U , τ L ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, the following evolution equations can be considered for the BB7 copula
where Λ 2 (x) ≡ (1 + exp(−x)) −1 is the logistic transformation, used to keep τ U and τ L in (0, 1) at all times.
